We study facility location problems where agents control multiple locations and when reporting their locations can choose to hide some locations (hiding), report some locations more than once (replication) and lie about their locations (manipulation). We fully characterize all facility location mechanisms that are anonymous, efficient, and strategyproof with respect to the richer strategic behavior for this setting. We also provide a characterization with respect to manipulation only. This is the first, to the best of our knowledge, characterization result for the strategyproof facility location mechanisms where each agent controls multiple locations.
Introduction
In a classic facility location problem, a social planner chooses to build a facility based on reported locations of agents on a real line. Each agent has one private location and prefers the facility to be built as close to her location as possible. Agents may choose to lie about their locations to influence where the facility is built. It is well-known that choosing the median of reported locations is not only strategyproof but also socially optimal, resulting in the smallest total distance between the facility and agents' locations. Moulin [1980] 's seminal work fully characterizes all strategyproof facility location mechanisms for this setting.
In many scenarios, for example when each agent represents a community, agents may control more than one locations. The social planner still hopes to select a location to build the facility based on agents' reported locations. The facility location problem where each agent controls multiple locations was first introduced by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [2009] . Choosing the social optimal solution, the median of all reported locations, is no longer strategyproof. Procaccia and Tennenholtz [2009] provided an intuitive, strategyproof mechanism that relabels each reported location by the corresponding agent's most preferred location and then chooses the median of the relabelled locations. The characterization of all strategyproof mechanisms remains an open question.
Moreover, strategyproof mechanisms so far only guard against one type of strategic behavior, that is agents may lie about their locations in reporting (which we call manipulation in this paper). But when agents control more than one locations, they can choose to hide some locations (hiding) or report some locations more than once (replication) to influence the facility location to their benefit. Strategyproof mechanisms need to be robust against these richer strategic actions. The above-mentioned mechanism provided by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [2009] is not strategyproof w.r.t. replication. Hossain et al. provided examples showing that facility location mechanisms where each agent controls multiple locations may be strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation but not hiding, or vice versa.
In this paper, we fully characterize strategyproof mechanisms w.r.t. the richer strategic actions for facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations. Intuitively, for each agent reporting multiple locations, one may treat her as an agent controlling a single location, her most preferred location, which is the median of her reported locations. By doing so, all the strategyproof mechanisms for single location agents should also be strategyproof for multiple location settings. One natural guess is that these are all strategyproof mechanisms we desired. This is however not true. We show that there exists other strategyproof mechanisms that depend on not only agents' most preferred locations but also their other reported locations.
To fully characterize all strategyproof facility location mechanisms where each agent controls multiple locations, we first show that if one cannot distinguish which locations are reported by the same agent, referred as settings with non-identifying locations, all strategyproof mechanisms outputs a constant location that is independent of the reported locations. Then for settings with identifying locations, we show a necessary property for any strategyproof mechanism: for each agent, the mechanism has at most two possible outputs fixing other agents' reports and the agent's most preferred location(s). Further adding the Pareto efficiency condition, we derive a full characterization for strategyproof mechanisms. Finally, we compare the result with the characterization for strategyproof mechanisms w.r.t. manipulation only, and discuss the group strategyproofness of the mechanisms. Dekel et al. [2010] investigated the framework of mechanism design problems in general learning-theoretic settings. The facility location problem where each agent controls multiple locations is its special case for one-dimensional linear regression, and was first introduced by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [2009] . Some deterministic and randomize mechanisms are provided by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [2009] , as well as Lu et al. [2009] , and they focused on the approximation ratio of these mechanisms, i.e. the total distance between the facility and all agents' locations compared with the optimal solution. Hossain et al. extended these studies for considering another strategic behavior, hiding, and provided a strategyproof mechanism w.r.t. both manipulation and hiding. On the other hand, Conitzer [2008] ; Todo et al. [2011] studied the strategyproofness w.r.t. false-name report, i.e. agents are able to create multiple anonymous identifiers. It is similar to our replication when the identifier of the agent reporting each locations is unknown.
Related Work
The facility location problems is also a framework for studying "single-peak" preference. As agents with such kind of preference are commonly seen in political decision making like voting [Moulin, 1980] , location on networks [Schummer and Vohra, 2002] , and resource allocation [Guo and Conitzer, 2010 ]. An extension for the preference structure is the "single-plateau" preference, where the most preferred locations of agents become intervals. Moulin [1984] ; Berga [1998] provided corresponding characterizations of strategyproof mechanisms for more general social choice settings. Following them, the characterizations were extended to high dimensional Euclidean space [Border and Jordan, 1983; Barberà et al., 1993 Barberà et al., , 1998 ] and convex spaces [Tang et al., 2018] . These works considered manipulation as the only strategic behavior, and agents are assumed to only report their "peak" or "plateau" preferences. In comparison, our work focuses on facility location settings where agents have "single-plateau" preferences and richer actions spaces.
Our Model
Following a brief explanation of notations, we introduce the facility location problem where each agent controls multiple locations, our richer strategic considerations, and desired properties of mechanisms for this problem.
. . , k} be the set of first k natural numbers. Given k real numbers t 1 , . . . , t k ∈ R ∪ {−∞, +∞} and t 1 ≤ · · · ≤ t k , let med(t 1 , . . . , t k ) be their median. When k is odd, med(t 1 , . . . , t k ) = t (k+1)/2 , and when k is even, med(t 1 , . . . , t k ) = [t k/2 , t k/2+1 ], which is a number if t k/2 = t k/2+1 and an interval otherwise. Given a set S of real numbers, possibly with some identical elements, |S| denotes the size of S, and med(S) is the median of all numbers in S.
Facility Location Problems.
There is a set of agents, [n] . Each agent i ∈ [n] controls a set of locations,
,ȳ i,j ∈ R, on the real line. Each agent i ∈ [n] is asked to report her set of locations to the principal. Let D i = {y i,j } j∈[|Di|] denote agent i's set of reported locations,with y i,j ∈ R. D i can differ fromD i in both size and values. We use D = {D i } i∈[n] to denote the set of locations reported by all agents and N = i∈[n] |D i | to represent the total number of reported locations. The principal seeks a mechanism π : R N → R such that π(D) is a proper location for building a facility that will be used by all agents. Each agent incurs a loss l(π(D),
for using a facility located at π(D). This loss function means that an agent's loss is minimized when the facility locates within an interval (the median of the agent's locations) and strictly increases as the facility moves away from the interval on either side. The following proposition formalizes this property.
Proposition 2.1. Loss function (1) represents "single-plateau" preferences. Let [y 0 i , y 1 i ] = med(D i ), where y 0 i ≤ y 1 i , represent the median interval of agent i's locations. Then
Strategic considerations. Agents want to report D i to minimize their loss. We allow three types of agent strategic behavior:
• Manipulation. Each agent i ∈ [n] may report different value for each of her controlled locations. This is the strategic behavior usually considered in the literature.
• Replication. Each agent i may report one or more of her locations for more than once. Note that even if an agent reports her controlled locations without replication, it is possible that some locations appear for more than once.
• Hiding. Each agent i may choose to no report some of her controlled locations.
The combination of these three types of strategic behavior allows agents to report a set of locations with any size and any value.
Desirable properties of mechanisms. The principle hopes to find a mechanism π that discourages strategic behavior of agents. We define three notions of strategyproofness that we'll consider. The notions of strategyproofness are with respect to one or more of the three types of strategic behavior.
Definition 2.1. A mechanism π(D) is strategyproof w.r.t. some set of strategic behavior if no agent can achieve less loss by deviating from truthfully reporting to a strategic action in the set, regardless of the reports of the other agents.
Definition 2.2. A mechanism π(D) is group strategyproof w.r.t. a set of strategic behavior if no coalition of agents can simultaneously adopt strategic actions in the set such that every agent in the coalition is strictly better off, regardless of the reports of the other agents.
Definition 2.3. A mechanism π(D) is strong group strategyproof w.r.t. a set of strategic behavior if no coalition of agents can simultaneously adopt strategic actions in the set such that no agent in the coalition is strictly worse off and some agent in the coalition is strictly better off, regardless of the reports of the other agents.
Note that a group strategyproof mechanism must be strategyproof and a strong group strategyproof mechanism must be group strategyproof, but not vice versa. We will discuss the corresponding difference in Section 5.
In addition to strategyproofness, two other properties are also desirable for facility location mechanisms.
Definition 2.4. A facility location mechanism π(D) is anonymous if its output is symmetric w.r.t. all agents.
Definition 2.5. A facility location mechanism π(D) is efficient if its output is Pareto optimal to all agents, i.e. there does not exist another location that is strictly better for at least one agent and not worse for all other agents.
When each agent only controls a single location, denoted by y i for i ∈ [n], Moulin [1980] characterizes that all facility location mechanisms that are anonymous and strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation are of the form π(D) = med(y 1 , . . . , y n , α 1 , . . . , α n+1 ), ∀y
where α 1 , . . . , α n+1 ∈ R ∪ {−∞, +∞} are constants; all facility location mechanisms that are anonymous, efficient, and strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation take the form π(D) = med(y 1 , . . . , y n , α 1 , . . . , α n−1 ), ∀y
where α 1 , . . . , α n−1 ∈ R ∪ {−∞, +∞} are constants.
Strategyproof Facility Location Mechanisms for Non-identifying Locations
We first show that when each agent can control multiple locations, being able to identify which locations are reported by the same agent is necessary for developing non-trivial strategyproof mechanisms. We use the term non-identifying locations to represent the case when one cannot tell which agent reports which location, or more formally, for any reported location y j i ∈ D, one cannot distinguish the agent i who has reported the location. We show below that with non-identifying locations, all strategyproof mechanisms must be the trivial constant mechanisms.
Theorem 3.1. For facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations, if the reported locations are non-identifying, then any mechanism that is strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation must output a constant location.
Proof. For convenience, denote the reported data set D as {y j } j∈ [N ] . Since the reported locations are nonidentifying, it is possible that |D i | = 1 for each i. Then according to Moulin [1980] , any strategyproof mechanism has the form π(D) = med(y 1 , . . . , y N , α 1 , . . . , α N +1 ), ∀y.
We next prove that α 1 = · · · = α N +1 = α for some α ∈ R ∪ {−∞, +∞}, which means the mechanism always returns a constant α. Suppose otherwise, w.l.o.g, let α 1 < α 2 ≤ α 3 · · · ≤ α N +1 . Then we can construct an example where an agent could achieve smaller loss through manipulation. ConsiderD 1 = {y 1 = α 1 } andD 2 = {y 2 , . . . , y N } as the real locations controlled by agent 1 and 2 respectively, where y N = α 2 and y j = (α 1 + α 2 )/2 for j = 2, . . . , N − 1. Then truthfully reporting results in π(D 1 ,D 2 ) = α 2 and agent 2 suffers a loss of (N − 2)(α 2 − α 1 )/2. If agent 2 misreports his locations by manipulating y N to y ′ N = (α 1 + α 2 )/2, then the mechanism will output (α 1 + α 2 )/2 and her loss becomes (α 2 − α 1 )/2, which is strictly smaller if N > 3.
Corollary 3.1. For facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations, if the reported locations are non-identifying, then any mechanism which is strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation, replication, and hiding, must output a constant location.
Thus, in the rest of the paper, we focus on facility location problems with identifying locations. We note that identifying locations do not conflict with anonymity. Anonymity means that a mechanism's outcome is not affected by relabelling of the agents, while identifying locations only require that one knows which locations are reported by the same agent and the labels of the agents are not important.
Strategyproof Facility Location Mechanisms for Identifying Locations
In this section, we characterize mechanisms that are anonymous, efficient and strategyproof w.r.t. all three types of strategic behavior. We show that these mechanisms take the form of Moulin's characterization (3) where the median of each agent's reported locations is used as the representative location for the agent. We further show in Section 4.1 that the family of anonymous, efficient and strategyproof mechanisms remain the same even if only manipulation is considered, when agents control the same number of locations. We develop our results by first characterizing mechanisms that are anonymous and strategyproof w.r.t. all three types of strategic behavior. Lemma 4.1 shows that from agent i's perspective, fixing other agents' reports, any anonymous and strategyproof mechanism can have at most two different outputs if the median of the agent's reported locations,
For facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations, if a mechanism π is anonymous and strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation, replication, and hiding, then from any agent i's perspective, for any y 0
The values of s i and h i depend on the reports of other agents D −i as well as y 0 i and y 1 i . Proof. If a mechanism outputs the optimal location based an agent's reported locations or a constant location, the agent has no incentive to misreport. Thus, we try to characterize strategyproof mechanisms beyond these two trivial types.
For each i ∈ [n] and D −i fixed, let [y 0 i , y 1 i ] = med(D i ) be the interval that any location inside is optimal for agent i's real controlled locations. Through manipulation, replication and hiding, agent i is able to misreport any possible location sets. Currently we focus on a special group of misreports, that is agent i does not change the median value (either one or two value) of her controlled locations but may misreport any others, i.e. all
, then when other agents report D −i , agent i with real controlled locationsD i = D 1 i will misreport D 2 i to obtain a smaller loss. This is a contradiction, which means there are at most two different outputs for all such
when other agents report D −i , agent i with real controlled locationsD i = D 2 i will misreport D 1 i to obtain smaller loss. Similarly, if y 0 i > h i , then when other agents report D −i , agent i with real controlled locationsD i = D 1 i will misreport D 2 i to obtain smaller loss. Thus, we know s i < y 0 i ≤ y 1 i < h i , and Eqn. (4) is straightforward.
The following example shows that a strategyproof mechanism indeed can have two different outputs, i.e. satisfying Eqn. (4) for s i = h i .
Example 4.1. For simplicity, suppose med(D i ) is a unique number for each i ∈ [n]. For given constants t 1 < t 2 ∈ R, let P = |{i|i ∈ [n], l(t 1 , D i ) ≤ l(t 2 , D i )}| be the number of agents who prefer t 1 to t 2 , and Q = |{i|i ∈ [n], l(t 1 , D i ) > l(t 2 , D i )}| be the number of agents who prefer t 2 to t 1 . Then the following mechanism is strategyproof:
where t * = med(med(D 1 ), . . . , med(D n ), α 1 , . . . , α n+1 ).
Notice that the mechanism in this example is not efficient. We formally prove this observation in the next lemma.
Lemma 4.2. For facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations, if a mechanism π is anonymous, efficient and strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation, replication, and hiding, then for any i ∈ [n], 
Proof of Lemma 4.3. If n = 1, an efficient mechanism should always output the median of the reported locations, which means I 1 = I 2 = ∅ by definition. For n = 2, w.o.l.g., assume there exists some D 2 with med(D 2 ) = [y 0 2 , y 1 2 ], y 0 1 , y 1 1 , and s 1 < y 0 1 ≤ y 1 1 < h 1 , such that π satisfies Eqn. (4) for all D 1 with [y 0 1 , y 1 1 ] = med(D 1 ). This means there exist at least two special location sets D 1 1 and D 2 1 such that π(D 1 1 , D 2 ) = s 1 and π(D 2 1 , D 2 ) = h 1 (for example D 1 1 = {s 1 , y 0 1 , y 1 1 , y 1 1 } and D 2 1 = {y 0 1 , y 0 1 , y 1 1 , h 1 }). If I 1 = ∅, that is y 0 2 ≤ s i and y 1 2 < h i , then π(D 2 1 , D 2 ) = h 1 is not efficient since any location between y 0 1 and y 1 1 is a better output for both agent 1 and 2. If I 2 = ∅, that is y 1 2 ≥ h i and y 0 2 > s i , then π(D 1 1 , D 2 ) = s 1 is not efficient since any location between y 0 1 and y 1 1 is a better output for both agent 1 and 2. Thus, the result holds for n = 2.
For n ≥ 3, assume there exist some i,
In the following proof, we shall derive contradictions for |I 1 | = 1, . . . , n − 1 by induction, and the corresponding analysis for I 2 is similar.
Step 1: Suppose |I 1 | = 1. This means there is only one j ∈ [n], such that [y 0 j , y 1 j ] = med(D j ), y 0 j ≤ s i and y 1 j < h i . Denote D −i,−j as the reported location sets by agents other than agent i and j, then we rewrite the fact that
then when agent i reports D 2 i and other agents report D −i,−j , agent j with real locationsD j = D ′ j will misreport D j to obtain a smaller loss. If π(D 2 i , D ′ j , D −i,−j ) < h i , then when agent i reports D 2 i and other agents report D −i,−j , agent j with real locationsD j = D j will misreport D ′ j to obtain a smaller loss. This means π(D 2 i , D ′ j , D −i,−j ) = h i . Step 1.2: h i is the only possible output. 
Step 1.3: There exists a beneficial misreport. Specifically, π(D 1 i , D ′ j , D −i,−j ) = h i . However, when agent j reports D ′ j and other agents report
by the anonymity, to obtain a smaller loss. This is a contradiction, meaning it is impossible that |I| = 1.
Step 2. Suppose we have proved it is impossible that |I| = 1, . . . , t for some t ≥ 1, we consider the case |I| = t + 1. Letĵ = arg min j∈I1 {y 0 j |[y 0 j , y 1 j ] = med(D j )}. Similarly, denote D −i,−ĵ as the reported location sets by agents other than agent i andĵ, and we rewrite the fact that π(D 1 i , Dĵ, D −i,−ĵ ) = s i and π(D 2 i , Dĵ, D −i,−ĵ ) = h i .
Step 2.1:
j is a better output for all agents j ∈ I 1 as well as agent i and not worse for other agents. If π(D 2 i , D ′ j , D −i,−ĵ ) > h i , then when agent i reports D 2 i and other agents report D −i,−ĵ , agent j with real locationsDĵ = D ′ j will misreport Dĵ to obtain a smaller loss. If y 0 j ≤ π(D 2 i , D ′ j , D −i,−ĵ ) < h i , then when agent i reports D 2 i and other agents report D −i,−ĵ , agentĵ with real locationsDĵ = Dĵ will misreport D ′ j to obtain a smaller loss. This means π(
Step 2.2: There must be another possible output
Then when agentĵ reports D ′ j and other agents report D −i,−ĵ , agent i with real locationsD i = D 1 i will misreport Dĵ, which leads to π(Dĵ, D ′ j , D −i,−ĵ ) = π(Dĵ, D 1 i , D −i,−ĵ ) = s i by anonymity, to obtain a smaller loss. This is a contradiction, meaning there must exist s 
and π satisfies Eqn. (4) for all D i satisfying that |D i | is an even number and [y 0 i , y 1 i ] = med(D i ). And for the corresponding new index set
Step 2.4: Repeating previous steps leads to |I ′ 1 | = t. Finally, if |I ′ 1 | > t, we can repeatedly replace the report of the agent whose location set has the leftmost median among those agents in I ′ 1 in the same way until |I ′ 1 | = t, and the same analysis still holds. Since such an index set satisfies |I ′ 1 | ≤ n − 1, after at most n − t − 1 times of such replacing, we must have |I ′ 1 | = t. However, we have already proved that it is impossible for |I 1 | = t. By induction, we provide contradictions for |I| = 1, . . . , n − 1, and this completes the proof of n ≥ 3.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Assume there exist some i, D −i , y 0 i ≤ y 1 i , and s i < y 0 i ≤ y 1 i < h i , such that π satisfies Eqn. (4) for all D i with [y 0 i , y 1 i ] = med(D i ). According to Lemma 4.3, we know for any j ∈ [n],
Then for any D i satisfying π(D i , D −i ) = s i , it is not efficient since s * is a better output for all agent j ∈ I while not worse for other agent. This is a contradiction to the efficiency condition.
Lemma 4.2 indicates that any mechanism π that is anonymous, efficient, and strategyproof, must only depend on the optimal location for each agent. In other words, agents only need to report their most preferred locations, i.e. med(D i ) for i ∈ [n]. With Moulin [1980] 's results, we have the complete characterization.
Theorem 4.1. For facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations, a mechanism π is anonymous, efficient and strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation, replication, and hiding, if and only if there exist α 1 , . . . , α n−1 ∈ R ∪ {−∞, +∞}, β ∈ [0, 1], for ∀D 1 , . . . , D n , π(D 1 , . . . , D n ) = med(y * 1 , . . . , y * n , α 1 , . . . , α n−1 )
where
Notice that if med(D i ) is an interval for some agent i, any value in the interval can be regarded as agent i's optimal location. For simplicity, we only include a tie-breaking rule based on an arbitrary constant β, which is independent of (α 1 , . . . , α n−1 ) and guarantees the strategyproofness. Moulin [1984] provided more general characterizations for strategyproof social choice mechanisms where each agent reports an interval as her "single-plateau" preference, which deal with the tie-breaking rules carefully.
Strategyproofness w.r.t. Manipulation Only
In most previous studies on facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations, manipulation is considered as the only strategic behavior that agents may take. Although some strategyproof mechanisms w.r.t. manipulation are discussed, there is no characterization result. To characterize such strategyproofness, we further assume that each agent control the same number of locations.
Theorem 4.2. For facility location problems where each agent controls same number of multiple locations, a mechanism π is anonymous, efficient and strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation, if and only if there exist α 1 , . . . , α n−1 ∈ R ∪ {−∞, +∞}, β ∈ [0, 1], for ∀D 1 , . . . , D n , π(D 1 , . . . , D n ) = med(y * 1 , . . . , y * n , α 1 , . . . , α n−1 )
where y * i = βy 0 i + (1 − β)y 1 i with [y 0 i , y 1 i ] = med(D i ), for i = 1, . . . , n.
The proof of Theorem 4.2 follows in a similar spirit as that of Theorem 4.1, which can be found in Appendix A. Lemma 4.1 still holds but the proof of Lemma 4.2 needs modification because we cannot directly apply Lemma 4.3.
Group Strategyproof Facility Location Mechanisms for Identifying Locations
If a mechanism is group strategyproof w.r.t. some set of strategic behavior, then it must be strategyproof w.r.t. the set of strategic behaviors. This means facility location mechanisms which are anonymous, efficient and group strategyproof should satisfy Eqn. (6). We can further show that these strategyproof mechanisms are indeed group strategyproof.
Theorem 5.1. For facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations, a mechanism π is anonymous, efficient and group strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation, replication, and hiding, if and only if there exist α 1 , . . . , α n−1 ∈ R ∪ {−∞, +∞}, β ∈ [0, 1], for ∀D 1 , . . . , D n , π(D 1 , . . . , D n ) = med(y * 1 , . . . , y * n , α 1 , . . . , α n−1 )
Proof. Let D i be any reported locations controlled by agent i with [y 0 i , y 1 i ] = med(D i ) for i ∈ [n]. For any agent i and any coalition S of agents including i, denote their real locations by D S = {D j } j∈S , and the reported locations of other agents by D −S . W.l.o.g. assume y 1 i < π(D S , D −S ). Consider any misreport by the coalition
Then π(D ′ S , D −S ) < π(D S , D −S ). This means there exists some j ∈ S such that y 1 j ≥ π(D S , D −S ), while after misreporting D ′ j = D j , some value y ′ j ∈ med(D ′ j ) satisfies y ′ j < π(D S , D −S ). Then for agent j, if y 0 j ≤ π(D S , D −S ), her loss cannot be smaller after such a misreport since her loss is minimized originally. If y 0 j > π(D S , D −S ), then after such a misreport she obtains a bigger loss. Thus, at least agent j in the coalition is not strictly better off, which completes the proof for group strategyproofness.
However, when some agent have multiple optimal locations, i.e. some agent i's real locations D i satisfies med(D i ) = [y 0 i , y 1 i ] and y 0 i < y 1 i , then most strategyproof mechanism satisfying Eqn. (6) is not strong group strategyproof. Here is a counter example.
Example 5.1. Let n = 3. For any anonymous, efficient and strategyproof mechanism π(D 1 , D 2 , D 3 ), let α 1 ≤ α 2 be the corresponding constants.
If α 1 < α 2 , let α 1 < y 0 1 < y 1 1 < α 2 , D 1 = {y 0 i , y 1 i }, D 2 = {y 0 i }, and D 3 = {y 1 i } as the real controlled locations of agent 1, 2, 3 respectively. Then π(D 1 , D 2 , D 3 ) = y * 1 , the value choosing from the interval [y 0 i , y 1 i ]. If y * 1 = y 0 1 , then agent 1 can misreport D ′ 1 = {y 1 1 , y 1 1 }, resulting in π(D 1 , D 2 , D 3 ) = y 1 1 which is better for agent 3 and not worse for agent 1 herself. Otherwise, y 0 1 < y * 1 ≤ y 1 1 , then agent 1 can misreport D ′ 1 = {y 0 1 , y 0 1 }, resulting in π(D 1 , D 2 , D 3 ) = y 0 1 which is better for agent 2 and not worse for agent 1 herself.
If
Similarly if y * 1 = y 0 1 , when D 2 = {y 1 i }, and D 3 = {y 1 i }, agent 1 truthfully reporting D 1 results in π(D 1 , D 2 , D 3 ) = α 1 . But agent 1 can misreport D ′ 1 = {y 1 1 , y 1 1 }, resulting in π(D 1 , D 2 , D 3 ) = y 1 1 which is better for agent 2 and 3, and not worse for agent 1. If y * 1 is chosen as any value satisfies y 0 1 < y * 1 ≤ y 1 1 , when D 2 = {y 0 i }, and D 3 = {y 0 i }, agent 1 truthfully reporting D 1 results in π(D 1 , D 2 , D 3 ) = y * 1 . But agent 1 can misreport D ′ 1 = {y 0 1 , y 0 1 }, resulting in π(D 1 , D 2 , D 3 ) = y 0 1 which is better for agent 2 and 3, and not worse for agent 1. If each agent is further assumed to have unique optimal location, then strategyproof mechanisms are also strong group strategyproof, the proof of which is similar as Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 5.2. For facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations and has an unique optimal location, a mechanism π is anonymous, efficient and strong group strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation if there exist α 1 , . . . , α n−1 ∈ R ∪ {−∞, +∞}, for ∀D 1 , . . . , D n , π(D 1 , . . . , D n ) = med(y * 1 , . . . , y * n , α 1 , . . . , α n−1 )
where y * i = med(D i ),i = 1, . . . , n.
Future Directions
We considered richer strategic behavior of agents in facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations. Facility location problems can be viewed as a single-dimension special case of the strategic linear regression problem, initially introduced by Dekel et al. [2010] . Prior work by Dekel et al. [2010] and Chen et al. [2018] have studied linear regression that are strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation. However, the regression mechanism proposed in Dekel et al. [2010] is not strategyproof w.r.t. replication. And the GRH mechanisms studied by Chen et al. [2018] , are not strategyproof w.r.t. to hiding. It will be interesting to characterize strategyproof linear regression under richer strategic considerations, especially because in practice commercial data sources often find it beneficial to replicate or hide part of their data. On the other hand, Section 4.1 showed that the family of anonymous, efficient and strategyproof mechanisms remains the same even if only manipulation is considered, when agents control the same number of locations. This is somewhat surprising because one may expect that the richer the strategic consideration the smaller the set of strategyproof mechanisms. It will be interesting to fully characterize the family of strategyproof mechanisms w.r.t. manipulation only, with the assumption that each agent controls the same number of locations dropped. 
for all D i with y * i = med(D i ); • if m is an even number, for each y 0
Proof. If a mechanism outputs the optimal location based an agent's reported locations or a constant location, the agent has no incentive to misreport. Thus, we try to characterize a strategyproof mechanism beyond these two trivial types. First for the case that m is an odd number, each agent i has an unique optimal location, denoted by y * i . We focus on all D i with y * i = med(D i ), which are possible misreports from the agent who manipulate its private locations. For any fixed D −i , suppose there are at least three different outputs π(
, then when other agents report D −i , agent i whose real controlled locationsD i = D 3 i will misreport D 2 i to obtain a smaller loss. Otherwise, y * i > π({D 2 i , D −i }), then when other agents report D −i , agent i whose real controlled locationsD i = D 1 i will misreport D 2 i to obtain a smaller loss. This is a contradiction, which means there are at most two different outputs for all such D i , denoted by s i < h i . Let π({D 1 i , D −i }) = s i and π({D 2 i , D −i }) = h i . (Here we ignore the case s i = h i corresponding to a constant output.) If y * i ≤ s i , when other agents report D −i , agent i whose real controlled locationsD i = D 2 i will misreport D 1 i . Similarly, if y * i ≥ h i , when other agents report D −i , agent i whose real controlled locationsD i = D 1 i will misreport D 2 i . Thus, we know s i < y * i < h i , and Eqn. (7) is straightforward. Finally, the case that m is an even number can be analyzed similarly.
In the next two lemma, corresponding to m is odd and even, we formally prove the case s i = h i in Eqn. (7) and Eqn. (8) will not happen if the mechanism is also efficient.
Lemma A.2. For facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations, if a mechanism π is anonymous, efficient and strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation, and m is an odd number, then for any i ∈ [n], D −i , y * i ∈ R, there do not exist s i , h i ∈ R such that s i < y * i < h i , and π satisfies Eqn. (7) for all D i with y * i = med(D i ). Proof. If n = 1, an efficient mechanism should always output the median of the reported locations.
For n = 2, w.o.l.g, assume there exists some D 2 with median denoted by y * 2 , y * 1 , and s 1 < y * 1 < h 1 , such that π satisfies Eqn. (7) for all D 1 with y * 1 = med(D 1 ). This means there exist at least two special location sets D 1 1 and D 2 1 such that π(D 1 1 , D 2 ) = s 1 and π(D 2 1 , D 2 ) = h 1 (for example D 1 1 = {s 1 , y * 1 , y * 1 } and D 2 1 = {y * 1 , y * 1 , h 1 }). If y * 2 ≥ y * 1 , then π(D 1 1 , D 2 ) = s 1 is not efficient since at least y * 1 is a better output for both agent 1 and 2. Similarly, if y * 2 < y * 1 , then π(D 2 1 , D 2 ) = h 1 is not efficient since at least y * 1 is a better output for both agent 1 and 2. It is a contradiction, so the result holds for n = 2.
For n ≥ 3, assume there exist some i, D −i , y * i , and s i < y * i < h i , such that π satisfies Eqn. (7) for all D i with y * i = med(D i ). Consider three special location sets D 1 i , D 2 i , D 3 i satisfying π(D 1 i , D −i ) = s i , π(D 2 i , D −i ) = h i , and l(s i , D 3 i ) = l(h i , D 3 i ). For example, D 1 i = {s i , y * i , y * i }, D 2 i = {y * i , y * i , h i } and
W.l.o.g., we assume π(D 3 i , D −i ) = h i . Define an index set I = {j|y * j = med(D j ), y * j ≤ s i }. By definition and the efficiency condition, we know 1 ≤ |I| ≤ n−1. In the following proof, we shall derive contradictions for |I| = 1, . . . , n − 1 by induction, thus the result holds for any n ≥ 3.
If |I| = 1, that is there is only one j ∈ [n], such that y * j = med(D j ) and y * j ≤ s i . Denote D −i,−j as the reported location sets by agents other than agent i and j, then we rewrite the fact that π(D 1 i , D j , D −i,−j ) = s i and π(D 2 i , D j , D −i,−j ) = h i . Consider agent j's another possible report D ′ j = D 1 i . Due to the efficiency, we know π(D 1 i , D ′ j , D −i,−j ) > s i ≥ y * j . If π(D 2 i , D ′ j , D −i,−j ) < h i , then when agent i reports D 2 i and other agents report D −i,−j , agent j with real locationsD j = D j will misreport D ′ j to obtain a smaller loss. If π(D 2 i , D ′ j , D −i,−j ) > h i , then when agent i reports D 2 i and other agents report D −i,−j , agent j with real locations areD j = D ′ j will misreport D j to obtain a smaller loss. This means π(D 2 i , D ′ j , D −i,−j ) = h i . Now for fixed D ′ j , D −i,−j , if there exists s ′ i < y * i such that for some D ′ i with
